Guglielmo Paesano AI engineer and founder of AIGROW

I build AI systems that do people's work, and I measure where they still need people.

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HackerSuite

A containerised lab for authorized security assessments, with every technique mapped to its detection.

HackerSuite is a containerised lab for authorized security assessments, organised around a phased playbook in which every technique is cross-referenced to the detection that would catch it. It runs assessments methodically and reproducibly, isolated from the host it runs on.

Status
Internal
Role
Author
Year
2024
HackerSuite film: the lab and its playbook

What it is

A lab for authorized assessments: a phased playbook run inside read-only Docker containers isolated from the host, with every technique cross-referenced to its MITRE ATT&CK identifier and to the detection rules that would catch it.

Built with

  • Python
  • Docker
  • MITRE ATT&CK
  • Sigma / YARA

What you can check

  • Phased playbook, each technique mapped to MITRE ATT&CK and detection rules
  • Read-only containers, VPN-routed, isolated from the host
  • Reports generated from the assessment output

What the lab is for

A security research lab is an environment for finding how systems fail before an attacker does, under controlled conditions and with the results written down. Its value is the method: the same phases, in the same order, producing a report that another person can act on.

Offensive tooling is abundant and mostly free. What is scarce is the discipline that turns a scan into a finding and a finding into a fix: a repeatable sequence, a way to record evidence, and a mapping from what was found to what should be done about it.

HackerSuite is built around that discipline. The tools matter less than the playbook that governs when and why they run, and the report templates that turn their output into something a defender can use.

The decision that shaped the whole system: isolation by default

Everything runs inside Docker containers with a read-only root filesystem and a tmpfs overlay, on a network mode that routes through a VPN rather than the host. The lab cannot casually touch the machine it runs on, which is the property that makes it safe to run real offensive tooling at all.

Running security tools directly on your workstation is how researchers compromise themselves. A read-only container filesystem means a tool cannot persist a change, a tmpfs overlay means its working state vanishes when it stops, and routing the network through a VPN keeps assessment traffic off the host identity. The rejected alternative, tools installed on the host for convenience, trades a real safety boundary for a few seconds of setup.

The containers are deliberately minimal: proof-of-concept scripts use the Python standard library rather than pulling external dependencies into the environment, because every dependency added to an offensive container is another thing that could be tampered with.

A playbook that maps offence to defence

The methodology is a phased playbook for authorized assessments. Its distinguishing feature is a cross-reference: every offensive technique is mapped to its MITRE ATT&CK identifier and to the detection rules that would catch it, so the same work produces both the attack and its defence.

A finding is only half useful if it says what is broken but not how it would be seen. Mapping each technique to MITRE ATT&CK and to Sigma and YARA detection rules means an assessment leaves behind a defensive artefact as well as an offensive one: the report says that something is exploitable and also what it looks like in your telemetry when someone exploits it.

Reporting that matches the target

Findings are turned into reports whose structure matches where they are going: an assessment deliverable for the engineers, an executive summary for the people who decide. The report is generated from the assessment output rather than written from scratch, so the evidence and the narrative cannot drift apart.

A finding written in the wrong shape for its reader does not get acted on. Templates that match the reader, and generation directly from the assessment output, remove the transcription errors of doing it by hand.

This is the same principle that runs through every project on this site: the record is generated from the work, not reconstructed after it.

Questions

Is this offensive or defensive security?
Both, deliberately. The methodology is offensive, but every technique is cross-referenced to its MITRE ATT&CK identifier and the detection rules that would catch it, so an assessment produces a defensive artefact as well as an exploit. Finding how a system fails is the fastest route to knowing how to watch for it failing.
How is the lab kept from compromising the machine it runs on?
Everything runs in Docker containers with a read-only root filesystem and a tmpfs overlay, with network traffic routed through a VPN rather than the host. A tool cannot persist a change to the host, its working state is discarded when it stops, and assessment traffic stays off the host identity.

Facts on this page verified 2026-08-08

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